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Cross-Border Attestation and
Interjurisdictional Wills
Richard F. Storrow*
Imagine a car moving rapidly along an interstate highway in the
northeast. Depending upon the location (and the level of traffic congestion), the car might move quickly between states. On Interstate 295, the
car could travel swiftly from New Jersey to Delaware and on into Maryland. Further south, the same interstate will propel cars from Maryland,
through Washington, D.C., and on into Virginia. Over to the west, cars
on Interstate 81 enter Maryland from Pennsylvania and after 12 miles
enter West Virginia. From there it is a mere 26 miles to the border of

Virginia.
Imagine now that inside the car a will execution ceremony is taking
place. The testator is sitting between the witnesses in the back seat, and
the attorney-notary is seated up front, turned to face the occupants of
the backseat and conducting the proceedings. On any of the hypothetical journeys described above, the testator might sign the will in the first
state, the witnesses might sign in the second and third states respectively, and, if this journey is along I-81, the attorney might complete the
notarization of the self-proving affidavit in yet a fourth state.
In a jurisprudential universe replete with numerous bizarre will execution quirks, a moving will execution ceremony is a fanciful way to
conjure a particular execution-related and jurisdictional question that
has arisen in will executions during the coronavirus pandemic: whether a
will executed interjurisdictionally is admissible to probate. The question
may have occurred to practitioners before the pandemic, but it is largely
unfamiliar, and it arises now in the context of a changing legal landscape
no one could have predicted. This essay will address what is likely to
become a more familiar manner of will execution in a post-pandemic
world by testing the admissibility of interjurisdictional wills to probate
against existing rules of probate jurisdiction and choice-of-law norms.
I.

FROM PRESENCE TO REMOTENESS

After over a year of effort to contain the coronavirus outbreak, remoteness is firmly embedded in the American psyche. At the beginning
of the pandemic, people remained locked down in their homes. Every* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law.
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day transactions became vectors of peril. The emphasis on presence in
estate planning caused will execution ceremonies to grind to a halt at
the precise moment many were confronting their mortality.
The workaround for remoteness in many areas of life has been
teleconferencing. But with physical presence firmly embedded in the
law of will execution, it has required a blizzard of emergency orders,
legislation, and court rules to permit the temporary use of simultaneous
audio-visual communication in the execution of wills.1 Many of these
rapid-response reforms include the requirement that the witnesses verify that they are "within the state" when the execution is taking place
on-line. 2 Unijurisdictionality in will execution may have been widely
practiced in the pre-pandemic world, but it was not a requirement under
pre-pandemic law. It is surprising that unijurisdictionality is a feature of
law reform aimed at embracing remoteness and unsettling that a remote
witness who is "across the border" could render a will inadmissible to
probate for failure of due execution.

II.

JURISDICTION

OR

EXECUTION?

Whether the court will admit a will to probate is both a question of
jurisdiction and execution. The jurisdictional question is relatively
straightforward: the courts of a state have jurisdiction over a domicili4
ary's estate, 3 and domiciliaries' property located in that state.
The fact that a court has jurisdiction over an estate does not mean
that a will intended to control its succession is valid in that court. That
determination will depend on whether the manner of the will's execution falls within the state's choice-of-law provision. Some states are restrictive in the sense that they will admit a will to probate only if it was
5
executed in conformity with that state's will execution requirements.
Most states are more flexible, however. They will "recognize a will if it
complies with one of the following: the local statute, the law of the
place 6 of execution of the will at the time of execution, or the law of the
decedent's domicile." 7 In other words, the place of a will's execution
makes no legal difference, as long as it conforms to at least one of sev1 See, e.g., Brian M. Sweet, Executing Wills and Trusts While Observing Distancing

Guidelines, NY Comm. TR. 1 (2020), https://www.nycommunitytrust.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/PronotesSpecial20_d.pdf.
2 Id. at 2.
3 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-301(1) (UNF. L. COMM'N amended 2019).
4 Id. § 1-301(2).
5 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-1 (2021).
6 The Uniform Probate Code specifies that "place" means "when [the will] is executed in another state or country." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 cmt.
7 See id.; Roger W. Andersen, Will Executions: A Modern Guide, 18 Am. J. TRIAL

Aovoc. 57, 58 (1994); see, e.g., 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/7-1 (2021). And of course the law
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eral permissible statutory regimes. 8 Although most states have expansive choice-of-law provisions, some make nonconformity with the local
will execution provisions expressly applicable only to wills "executed
outside this state." 9
Choice-of-law provisions broaden the typical bases for admission to
probate in other ways as well. Some include conformity either with the
law at the time the will was executed or at the time the testator died. 10
Still others recognize wills that have been admitted to probate in any
other jurisdiction. 1 ' The similarity in will execution requirements across
jurisdictions means that an individual will may be admissible to probate
on several of these grounds. The policy is "to provide a wide opportunity for validation of expectations of testators."1 2 As such, the Uniform
Probate Code does not limit its permissive stance to wills executed
outside the state and in fact broadens it further to include the law of the
state where the testator is domiciled, has a residence, or the country
where he is a national.1 3 Under such broad and permissive choice-of-law
provisions, a court with jurisdiction over an estate will admit to probate
wills executed under varying will execution models.
III.

IN RE ESTATE OF HOOK

Although not a will-execution-in-a-moving-car case, In re Estate of
Hook1 4 does involve the cross-border completion of a will, even if the
court did not see it that way. Bert Hook remained unmarried and childless throughout his life. At the time of his death, he was domiciled in
Washington and had a residence in Arizona. His 1988 will, executed in
Washington, bequeathed his entire estate to his brother Jerry. In 2012,
while in Arizona, Hook prepared a new will benefiting Jerry and two
friends. Hook's signature was witnessed by a notary, 15 but the second
witness, Anna Levitte, did not sign the will until after Hook had passed
of the place of execution will include its own choice-of-law provision, rendering even that
ground for admission to probate more permissive than it might at first appear.
8
9
10
11

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (2021).
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-107 (2021).

Id. § 11.12.020(1).
15 GUAM CODE ANN. § 1509 (2016).

12 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-506 cmt.

13 Id. § 2-506; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-135 (2021).
14 374 P.3d 215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
15 The attorney notarized the will, raising the issue of whether she had signed in the
capacity of a witness or in her capacity as a notary. Id. at 218; see In re Hammer's Estate,
72 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (Sur. Ct. 1946) (ruling that a notarization conducted to authenticate
the testator's signature did not satisfy the witnessing requirement). Under the Uniform
Probate Code, the notarization of a will is sufficient by itself; witnesses are not required.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B).
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away. 16 Moreover, she signed the will in Washington, which had jurisdiction over Hook's estate.
Washington law requires the witnesses to sign in the presence of the
testator.1 7 Washington also recognizes wills that comply with the law
either of the place of their execution or of the testator's domicile.' 8
Hook's will did not comply with Washington's will-execution ground
rules, but it did comply with Arizona's, which allows witnesses to sign
the will "within a reasonable time,"1 9 even after the testator has died. 20
The problem, though, the court reasoned, was that Arizona was not the
place of the will's execution, Washington was. To reach this rather surprising conclusion about a will that was not signed by the testator in
Washington, both the trial and appellate courts reasoned that a will is
not executed until "the last formal act necessary to make the will valid"
takes place. 21 Necessarily, then, execution "comprises the acts of the
witnesses as well as the act of the testator." 2 2 This meant that Hook's
will was not actually executed until Levitte signed it. 23 Since she did so
in Washington, the will was ipso facto executed in Washington. And
since Hook's will was not a foreign will in the courts' estimations, there
was no exception: the will had to comply with Washington law or it
could not be admitted to probate.
The Hook decision lacks rigor. First, the law of wills tells us little
about where a will must be executed or if it must be executed in a particular place for it to be admitted to probate in a court with jurisdiction
over some or all of a decedent's estate. Indeed, no will execution statute
requires a will to be executed in the same state where it is presented for
probate. Each state has a choice of law provision indicating the models
of will execution it will accept as valid. Tellingly, only one of the choice16 See In re Hook, 374 P.3d at 217. The parties may have been under the mistaken

impression that only notarization was required to validate the will, but the decision is
unclear on this point. See also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 cmt.
17 See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (2021).
18 The words "executed without this state" to describe these other wills appeared in

the 1917 version of the statute, 1917 Wash. Sess. Laws 649, survived revisions in 1929 and
1965, 1929 Wash. Sess. Laws 19; 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1448, but then were expressly
stricken from the statute in 1990, WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020(1) (1990). It bears noting that "foreign wills" appears as a heading as early as 1917 but does not appear in the
statutory text. The heading inexplicably remained in place after the 1990 revision, which
appears to render the "foreignness" of a will irrelevant. In any event, section headings in
Section 11 of the Washington Revised Code are not part of the law. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.02.001.
19 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2502(A)(3) (2021).
20 See In re Estate of Jung, 109 P.3d 97, 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
21 In re Hook, 374 P.3d at 216-17.
22 Id. at 219.

23 See id. at 216-17, 219-20.
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of-law bases described by Professor Andersen 24 for probating a will suggests a will might have a legally significant "place of execution" at all.
Neither compliance with the local law nor compliance with the law of
the testator's domicile is predicated on the will's having a particular
place of execution. Linking all three grounds is the basic notion that a
will needs to be in compliance with a statute somewhere. Washington's
law reflects this understanding by eliminating any distinction between
wills executed within and without the state.25 It is thus unfathomable
that the resolution of Hook boiled down to an irrelevant discussion of
whether the will could be admitted to probate as a foreign will.
Second, the court's first-impression analysis that "execution" has
such a specific meaning that the moment it occurs can be pinpointed
with precision is the weakest link in its reasoning. It fails to acknowledge
the nuances inherent in the terms "executed" and "execution." These
terms do not have fixed meanings in either legislation or jurisprudence
and are especially indefinite when unmodified by "complete," "valid,"
"effective" or other words of similar effect that the Hook court uses
copiously throughout the decision with no acknowledgment either of
their significance or that they do not appear in the statute. Even the lost
wills statute the court looks to for support requires proof of both the
execution and the validity of the lost will. 2 6
To most practitioners, a will execution connotes a process, as in a
will execution ceremony consisting of all the steps necessary to make a
will legally enforceable upon the death of the testator. 27 "Executed," by
contrast, connotes completion, but this completion can refer to the completion by the testator of his signature, as where we speak of a testator's
executing his will,28 after which we might say that the witnesses have
witnessed or attested the execution of the will2 9 or that they themselves
24 See Andersen, supra note 7.
25 See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1990) (noting that Washington expunged the
descriptor "executed without the state .... "); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.100

(2020) (stating that there shall be no distinction between domestic and foreign wills once
probated, and appearing to define a foreign will as one that has been probated elsewhere,
not necessarily executed elsewhere).
26 WASH. REv. CODE

§

11.20.070(1).

27 Turlington v. Neighbors, 24 S.E.2d 648, 650 (N.C. 1943) ("The 'execution' of a
deed means . . . all acts which are necessary to give effect thereto.") (citation omitted).
28 See, e.g., In re Estate of Phillips, 112 N.W.2d 591, 596 (Wis. 1961); In re Estate of
Picillo, 99 A.3d 975, 978 (R.I. 2014) ("The testatrix executed the will that night."); In re
Will of Carter, 565 A.2d 933, 934 (Del. 1989); In re Hackney, 707 So. 2d 1302, 1306 (La.
Ct. App. 1998).
29 See, e.g., Amerson v. Pahl, 734 S.E.2d 399, 400 (Ga. 2012); Phillips,112 N.W.2d at
596; In re Kelly's Will, 174 S.E. 453, 454 (N.C. 1934); In re Estate of Holloway, 235 P.
1012, 1016 (Cal. 1925); In re Tayrien's Estate, 246 P. 400, 401 (Okla. 1926); In re Estate of
Horowitz, No. 92-T-4710, 1993 WL 150487, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1993).
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have executed it.30 "Executed" can also refer to the completion of the
ceremony, after which we might say that the will is "fully" rather than
"partially" executed. 31 In one particularly odd use of "executed," the
testator is said to have executed a will "which she did not sign." 32 "Execution" can even have more far-flung definitions, as when it refers to the
will's taking effect at the testator's death 33 or even to the executor's
execution of the directions in the will. 34 Even "due execution" may have
a meaning that extends beyond the observance of will execution to encompass a probate court's sense of the will's genuineness. 35
The Hook decision exhibits unawareness of these varying usages,
but more important is its lack of understanding of will execution as a
process whose point of focus is the moment the testator signs the document. The testator's signature evidences his resolve to render the appointive and dispositive provisions he has included in the document
legally enforceable should he then die. The witnesses' primary role is to
perceive this essential moment of the will's execution. When they sign,
they thus attest to something they already have done. Where or when
they sign the document is really beside the point, as statutes that allow
witnesses to sign within a reasonable time recognize. Bolstering this understanding are statutes that define the "place of execution" of a will as
"the place where the testator is physically present when the testator executes the will." 3 6 The Hook court's declaration that Levitte's signature
in Washington made the will ipso facto executed in Washington when
nothing else of importance had occurred there is supported by none of
these principles. The execution process in Hook took place over several
weeks and interjurisdictionally. Concluding that it was executed in
Washington was analytically lazy: it made no sense doctrinally or as a
matter of policy. The court's myopia prevented it from seriously considering either that the will was executed in Arizona or, more importantly,
that it was an interjurisdictional will, executed, as it were, across borders
and neither solely in Arizona nor solely in Washington.
30 See, e.g., In re Estate of Yelvington, 280 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
see also Hendry v. Wilson, 151 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ark. 1941).
31 Compare In re Estate of Goodwin, 18 P.3d 373, 375 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (contending that every will, except a-holographic or nuncupative will, must be subscribed at
the end by the testator, or another person, within his presence and by direction, must
subscribe his name), with Swain v. Lee, 700 S.E.2d 541, 543 (Ga. 2010) (stating that a will
is partially executed, and thus invalid, if it is not attested and subscribed in the presence

of two witnesses).

32 Durell v. Martin, 110 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tenn. 1937).
33 See Cent. Nat'l Bank v. Stevenson, 16 A.2d 114, 115 (Del. Ch. 1940).
34 See In re Richardson's Will, 229 N.Y.S. 299, 300 (Sur. Ct. 1928).
35 See In re Estate of Huston, 27 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1947).
36 See, e.g., Axiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2506(B) (2021).
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Determining where Hook's will was executed was of no importance
to the outcome of the case. This is not to argue that Hook was wrongly
decided. Washington admits to probate wills executed under a number
of different models. The 2010 will did not satisfy any of these models for
reasons having nothing to do with where it was executed.
IV.

REMOTE ATTESTATION AND ELECTRONIC WILLS

The primary distinction between the fanciful will-execution-in-amoving-car hypothetical and Hook is that the hypothetical describes a
will execution ceremony, an event at which the execution of the will is
completed in one sitting. Pre-pandemic it was difficult to conceive of
such a ceremony occurring across borders. In Hook, the will execution
was not a ceremony but was performed piecemeal, of a sort allowed by
statutes that do not require the testator to sign the will in the presence
of the witnesses but instead to "acknowledge" his signature to them
later.37 It probably happens very seldom, but it is easy to imagine the
components of a will executed in this fashion to be completed in different jurisdictions. Indeed, in Hook this is precisely how it happened, with
the testator executing the will in one jurisdiction and one of the witnesses attesting his signature in another.
Now that simultaneous audio-visual communication is a widely accepted emergency measure for conducting will execution ceremonies, it
is easy to imagine a will execution ceremony occurring across jurisdictional borders. Moving will execution ceremonies into cyberspace makes
it a distinct possibility that the testator and the witnesses will not all be
in the same jurisdiction when the will is executed. Executive orders have
addressed this possibility in different ways. Maine's, for example, specifies that the witnesses must verify that they are in the state;38 Arkansas's
does not. 39 Maryland's requires that the witness "be physically located
37 See, e.g., id. § 14-2502(A)(3).
38 Me. Exec. Order No. 79 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/
sites/maine.gov.governor.mills/files/inline-files/E037.pdf;

see also COLO. CODE REGS.

§ 1505-11 (2020) (effective March 30, 2020 through December 31, 2020); Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-20 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
EO-20-20-Executed.pdf; Mo. Exec. Order No. 20-14 (Sept. 3, 2020), https://
Act to Provide
www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/Library/Reference/Orders/2020/20-14.pdf;
Aid to North Carolinians in Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Crisis, § 4.2(a), 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 34 (requiring the will to state "the county [in the
State of North Carolina] in which each remote witness was physically located when witnessing execution of the record"); Tenn. Exec. Order No. 72 (Feb. 26, 2020), https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-lee72.pdf.
39 Ark. Exec. No. 20-12 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/images/
uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-12._.pdf.
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40
in the United States at the time the document is witnessed." Michigan's hybrid approach requires in-state presence of the witness unless
4
the document relates to a matter over which Michigan has jurisdiction. 1
Clearly, remote attestation has sparked a robust dialogue about the importance of the location of the witnesses when they attest the will.
Given that the location of the attesting witness made little difference pre-pandemic, it must be the new availability of remote attestation
that makes the witnesses' location a matter of such concern in the present moment. In light of the traditionally liberal choice-of-law principles
described above, any insistence on unijurisdictionality seems a step in
the wrong direction. In Hook, the court seemed incapable of characterizing the will as interjurisdictionally executed. Had the court done so the
will may well have been admitted to probate. Under some executive
orders permitting remote attestation during the pandemic, though, it
would not. Had Hook executed his will pursuant to one of these orders,
with Levitte attesting his will from a different state, the will would fail
for lack of due execution. This need for unijurisdictional execution
under pandemic-related emergency orders seems not in keeping with
the need to address urgent estate planning imperatives with more remoteness rather than less. It also introduces an unnecessary obstacle to
validating wills for probate within a legal landscape where the location
of the witnesses has traditionally assumed no significance.
In parallel with the ongoing experiment with remote attestation is
the longstanding interest in electronic wills. Before the pandemic, a few
states had moved sluggishly in that direction. 42 Remote attestation has
brought renewed interest, possibly because pairing remote attestation
with electronic wills would be a boon to estate planning and possibly
because many associate on-line execution with electronic wills, although
the two are distinct. Until recently, at least in general, an electronic will
could not be remotely attested, and remote attestation could not be
used to complete an electronic will.
New legislation suggests that states may be poised to embrace, on a
permanent basis, one or both of these reforms. Washington, for example, has moved rapidly to embrace both electronic wills and remote attestation along with expansive choice-of-law rules that make Hook look
like an anachronism best forgotten. The legislation, which takes effect in

40 Md. Exec. Order No. 20-04-10-01 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Remote-Witnessing-4.10.20.pdf.
41 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-74 (May 5, 2020) https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/
0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-528192--,00.html [https://perma.cc/7SKP-KG2Z] (rescinded).
42 Will Electronic Wills Be the New Normal?, ELDER LAw ANSWERS (Jan. 6, 2021),
[https://
https://www.elderlawanswers.com/will-electronic-wills-be-the-new-normal-17935
perma.cc/8JVA-7QQZ].
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January of 2022, validates an electronic will that conforms to the law of
the jurisdiction where the testator executed it or was domiciled or resided either at the time of execution or at the time of death. 43 No attempt is made in the legislation to draw a meaningless distinction
between a "Washington" and a "foreign" will. Unfortunately, these reforms do not apply to pen-and-paper wills 4 4 so that in the short term at
least there will be two separate and unequal avenues for evaluating the
admissibility of wills to probate, at least if Hook continues to be good
law. Practitioners may well have to cope with this dual-track in the
choice-of-law realm for the foreseeable future. There is, however, no
way back. Legislative activity will eventually confirm that the place of a
will's execution has no legal significance and that a probate court with
jurisdiction over a testator's estate should look with favor upon the execution requirements of whatever jurisdictions the testator had significant contacts with.

43 S.B. 5132, 67th Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2021).

44 Id.

